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I. INTRODUCTION
-This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not
prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable."1
In Bennis v. Michigan,2 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the forfeiture of a wife's interest in a sedan, jointly owned by her and
her husband, because the husband engaged in a sexual act with a
prostitute in that sedan. The facial injustice of the ruling engenders
an emotional protest, particularly because the subject matter concerns
domestic relations and personal property, issues familiar to most
Americans.
Statutory in rem civil forfeiture, which procedurally rests upon the
fiction that property used unlawfully is itself guilty of the unlawful
offense and should be punished by forfeiture, traditionally proceeds
with no investigation as to the culpability of the owner. In the past
forty years, the United States Supreme Court, in both dicta and hold-
ings, has indicated a retreat from the strict application of the guilty
property fiction and suggested the possibility of a constitutional inno-
cent owner's defense to in rem forfeitures. Unfortunately, in Bennis,
the United States Supreme Court once again refused to recognize a
constitutional innocent owner's defense to statutory in rem civil forfei-
ture. The Court achieved this dubious result by calling into question
the categorical definition of punishment in civil actions established in
United States v. Halper3 and Austin v. United States.4
This Note presents a brief review of the historical underpinnings of
statutory in rem civil forfeiture in American jurisprudence and then
examines the relatively recent contributions of United States
Supreme Court cases, most notably Austin, which introduced constitu-
tional protections available to owners in in rem forfeiture actions.
Bennis v. Michigan is then introduced and analyzed, highlighting the
Court's inconsistent reasoning in upholding the forfeiture in Bennis
despite its holding in Austin, which was decided only three years ear-
lier. Finally, this Note proposes a threshold test for application of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND OF IN REM CIL FORFEITURE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Statutory in rem civil forfeiture has a history in the United States
that is nearly as long as American jurisprudence itself. While it ex-
isted in various guises in England, it initially appeared in the United
States in the context of admiralty and as a tool to enforce revenue and
1. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001-02 (1996)(Thomas, J., concurring).
2. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
3. 490 U.S. 435 (1989)
4. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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customs laws. 5 Forfeiture of property was commonly used against
bootleggers during and after prohibition. Civil in rem forfeiture has
lately become a favorite and oft-used tool in the fight against organ-
ized crime and the illegal drug trade.6 Federal and state statutes pro-
vide for the forfeiture of property that is an "instrumentality" of
criminal activity, as well as contraband and property that can be
shown to be the proceeds of criminal activity.
A. The Guilty Property Fiction
A typical in rem action proceeds against the property to determine
rights (usually title) in the property when a dispute arises between
two or more parties. In rem forfeiture actions, like traditional in rem
actions, proceed against the property, but in rem forfeiture actions dif-
fer in that they rest on the "guilty property" fiction. The guilty prop-
erty fiction holds that if otherwise lawful property is used for an
unlawful purpose, the property itself is considered to be guilty of the
offense and therefore should suffer forfeiture. The owner is simply an
interested nonparty.
It is the nonparty status of the owner that traditionally and proce-
durally prevents any opportunity to raise innocence as a defense to
the forfeiture. Most civil in rem forfeiture statutes, such as those in
the federal antidrug statutes, include a provision for an innocent
owner's defense.7 Occasional situations arise, however, when the
property is used in an unlawful manner without the knowledge or con-
sent of the owner to the unlawful use. The applicable statutes provide
no "safe harbor" for innocent owners in these instances. To date, in-
nocents have not fared well in forfeiture cases brought before the
United States Supreme Court.
B. The Owner-Property Relationship
In 1827, in The Palmyra,S the Supreme Court made clear that the
guilty property fiction, strictly applied, insulates the government from
5. For a short summary of the history and development of in rem civil forfeiture in
the United States, see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
6. Medrith Lee Hager & Sarah N. Welling, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the
Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States, 83 Ky. L.J.
835, 837-38 (1995).
7. "[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of the interest
of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed without the knowledge or consent of that owner...." 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1994). Under the Federal antidrug statutes, once the government
shows probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, the burden shifts
to the owner to show he had no knowledge or reason to know the property would
be used in an unlawful manner.
8. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
199'7]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
any need to consider the guilt or innocence of the property owner rela-
tive to the offense giving rise to the forfeiture. In The Palmyra, a case
involving the forfeiture of a pirate vessel, Justice Story stated that
"[tihe thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offence is attached primarily to the thing.... [Tihe proceeding in rem
stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceed-
ing in personam."9 According to the Palmyra Court, forfeiture may
arise without any reference to the culpability of the owner. At English
common law, a conviction of the owner was unnecessary in cases of
"seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the
revenue side of the Exchequer."1o
Despite this common law tradition, the United States Supreme
Court has stated in dicta that before a forfeiture will be sustained,
there must exist some minimal nexus beyond ownership between the
owner and the property being forfeited. In Peisch v. Ware,"1 the Court
articulated the relationship required between owner and property. In
Peisch, the government sought to forfeit cargo salvaged from a
wrecked ship after the salvors who discovered the wreck, acting with-
out consent or knowledge of the owner, removed the cargo from the
custody of the customs agent before any duty had been paid.
ET]he removal for which the [forfeiture statute] punishes the owner with a
forfeiture of the goods must be made with his consent or connivance, or with
that of some person employed or trusted by him. If, by private theft, or open
robbery, without any fault on his part, his property should be invaded,... the
law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that
property....
... [Tihe law is not understood to forfeit the property of owners or consign-
ees, on account of the misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such owners
or consignees could have no controul. 12
By this statement, the Court clearly delineates the two extremes of
the spectrum of possible relationships between the owner and the un-
lawful property use: the "guilty" owner who uses his property unlaw-
fully or knowingly consents to its unlawful use, and the "innocent
owner whose property is unlawfully used without his control, knowl-
edge, or consent. Since Peisch, the Court has had no opportunity to
consider a forfeiture concerning property used without any owner's
consent whatsoever. It has consistently reserved the question of
whether property may be forfeited if it is stolen from the owner and
later used unlawfully.1S But relationships falling in the gray area be-
9. Id. at 14-15.
10. Id. at 14 (explaining why the old English rules pertaining to forfeiture of goods to
the crown upon commission of a felony are inapplicable).
11. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808).
12. Id. at 364-65.
13. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974)(citing
Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808)). "It is unnecessary for us to inquire
whether the police power of the state extends to the confiscation of the property of
158 [Vol. 76:155
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tween the two extremes have regularly been found by courts to sup-
port forfeiture despite evidence of an owner's innocence. Ship owners,
lessors, and secured creditors have all lost property through in rem
forfeiture due to unlawful use of the property by others.
In United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel,14 a case of a
merchant ship crew that committed acts of piracy, the Court allowed
forfeiture of the ship even though it acknowledged the proven inno-
cence of the owners regarding the unlawful acts. "The vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instru-
ment or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference
whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner."15
In United States v. Dobbins's Distillery,16 personal and real prop-
erty was forfeited because, unknown to the owner, the lessee of the
distillery cooked the books to defraud the government of revenue.
Again, the offense attached to the property "without any regard what-
soever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner, be-
yond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property
to the distiller, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the lessee as
a distillery."17
A similar fate befell a secured creditor in Goldsmith-Grant v.
United States.'S The Grant Company sold a car and retained title
against payments owed. The vehicle eventually was used to transport
liquor in violation of the revenue laws, which contained no provision
exempting the interests of innocent owners. The company argued that
the relationship between buyer and secured creditor differed from the
relationships found in previous cases. The company pointed out that
in this situation no agency relationship existed and that the company,
as owner, had no opportunity to determine the use to which the prop-
erty would be put. Therefore, the owner urged the Court to deny for-
feiture in this situation.' 9 Unpersuaded, the Court allowed the
forfeiture.20
The common theme arising in forfeiture cases when the owner
raises innocence as a defense is as follows: as long as control of the
innocent persons appropriated and used by the law breaker without the owner's
consent .... " Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926). "[]e also reserve
opinion as to whether the section can be extended to property stolen from the
owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent." United
States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 333 (1926)(quoting Gold-
smith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921)).
14. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
15. Id. at 233.
16. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
17. Id. at 401.
18. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
19. Id. at 512.
20. Id.
1997]
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property voluntarily passes from the owner, forfeiture will be allowed
despite a complete and proven lack of culpability on the part of the
owner for the offense committed with the property. The owner need
only consent to the use of the property and need not consent to, or
even have reason to know of, the misuse. The Court has, however,
continued to reserve the question of whether a forfeiture would be al-
lowed in a case where the property was stolen from the owner and
later used unlawfully.21
III. THE UNDERPINNINGS
The United States Supreme Court uses several lines of reasoning,
both historical and contemporary, to justify the forfeiture of property
belonging to nonculpable persons. The most consistently cited reason
is that the owner is properly punished for an implied negligence or
carelessness for allowing his property to be used improperly. Black-
stone is often cited in support of this reasoning.2 2 The negligent
owner theory is logically consistent with Peisch and the continued res-
ervation of the question as to the forfeitability of stolen property. In
admiralty cases, when ships are taken on the high seas, the owners
might never be reached by the personal jurisdiction of an American
court. The seizure and forfeiture of the vessel is thus often the only
practicable source of redress for injured parties.
Other justifications for the forfeiture of property belonging to inno-
cent owners reflect more contemporary concerns. The Goldsmith
Court, in countering an assertion that Congress intended only the
property of guilty owners to be forfeited, theorized:
In breaches of revenue provisions, some forms of property are facilities, and
therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and responsibility
of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions,
by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and
guilt in the wrong. 23
The Supreme Court pointed out just five years later that "[tihe law
thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to col-
lusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner."24
Through this rationalization, the guilty property fiction (which has its
roots in English common law) becomes an expedient vehicle for ad-
dressing modem legitimate governmental interests. Most often, the
legitimate governmental interest is deterrence. 25
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993); Goldsmith-Grant v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
23. Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
24. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926).
25. For example, in advancing the government interest, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]o the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors,
[Vol. 76:155
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Despite this modern rationalization, it appears that the justifica-
tion for the guilty property fiction, and its attendant lack of considera-
tion of the culpability of the owner, is based primarily on its antiquity
and reliance on tradition. The Supreme Court has never definitively
stated the theory upon which statutory in rem forfeitures rests.26 In
fact, the justification or theoretical basis now seems unimportant in
the eyes of the Court. "[Whether the reason for [the forfeiture] be
artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial ju-
risprudence of the country to be now displaced."27
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: RECOGNITION OF
OWNER'S RIGHTS
Notwithstanding the Court's language in Bennis, in the past thirty
years, the Supreme Court has indicated a possible retreat from the
strict application of the guilty property fiction and the forfeiture of
property belonging to innocent owners. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania,2s evidence obtained from an unlawful search of a car
was used in an in rem action to forfeit the car. The United States
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protections applied
to forfeiture proceedings against the car when the forfeiture results
from some offense by the owner.29 The Court had no occasion to de-
cide if the evidence could have been used against an innocent owner
who had loaned or rented the car to another.30 The ruling is signifi-
cant, however, in that even though the action was in rem, and thusagainst "guilty" property (which has no rights), the Court acknowl-
edged that the action was, for practical purposes, against the owner.
bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation
may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in trans-
ferring possession of their property." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974).
26. The majority in Austin did conclude that civil in rem forfeiture rested upon the
notion of negligence on the part of the owner. This conclusion, however, was in
dicta, rather than a definitive statement in the holding of the case. See Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). See also discussion infra Part V.
27. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974)(quoting
Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)). See also Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (1996).
28. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
29. Id. at 700-01.
30. The Court stated that in rem forfeiture proceedings against an owner because of
offenses committed by the owner are criminal in nature despite their civil form,
thus necessarily implicating constitutional protections available to the defendant
in a criminal action, particularly those embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 697. Literally applied to the unique facts of Bennis, when one owner has com-
mitted an offense and the other is innocent, this results in the absurd conclusion
that an action that is criminal in nature against one owner affords Fourth
Amendment protections to the wrongdoer. Yet, a civil action against the innocent
owner will not provide that owner similar protections.
19971
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The owner, in turn, could raise his own constitutional rights even
though he was technically not a party to the action.
In United States v. United States Coin and Currency,Sl dicta illus-
trated the Court's skepticism regarding the strict application of in rem
forfeiture to innocent owners and suggested another constitutional
protection may be available to property owners in in rem forfeitures.
While acknowledging the strong historical support for forfeiture of
property belonging to innocent owners, the Court stated that
we would first have to be satisfied that a forfeiture statute, with such a broad
sweep [as to include the property of innocent owners], did not raise serious
constitutional questions under that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
commands that no person shall be "deprived of... property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Even Blackstone... condemned the seizure of the property of
the innocent as based on a "superstition" inherited from the "blind days" of
feudalism.32
Three years later, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,33
the Court used dicta once again to open the door a bit further for the
possibility of an innocent owner's defense. In Calero-Toledo, a yacht
belonging to a leasing company was forfeited when drugs were discov-
ered in the possession of the lessee on board the yacht. After citing
Peisch and the proposition that forfeiture might not lie against an
owner whose property has been stolen from him, the Calero-Toledo
Court added that "the same might be said of an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity,
but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to pre-
vent the proscribed use of his property."3 4 The Court did not elaborate
on what steps the owner could have taken, and the owner did not at-
tempt to make such a showing. Thus, the forfeiture was affirmed.
The clear implication is that an owner who could establish his inno-
cence by showing active steps taken to avoid the unlawful use could
prevail in a forfeiture action. The dicta from both Coin and Currency
and Calero-Toledo lend substantial weight to the underlying justifica-
tion of implied negligence on the part of the owner. And, by implica-
tion, the dicta weakens strict application of the guilty property fiction
by suggesting that factors other than the unlawful use of the property
should be considered in an in rem forfeiture.
31. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
32. Id. at 720.
33. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
34. Id. at 689. Even though the leasing company included a provision in the lease
prohibiting unlawful use of the vessel, it did not fall into this "actively innocent"
category.
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V. AUSTIN V. UNITED STATES
A. Forfeitures as Punishment and the Excessive Fines
Clause
In 1993, two more factors entered into the civil forfeiture formula.
In Austin v. United States,35 the government sought the forfeiture of a
mobile home and a body shop because the owner engaged in a single
drug transaction on the property. The defendant, Austin, claimed the
forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amend-
ment.36 The United States Supreme Court held that the Excessive
Fines Clause could be applied to civil in rem forfeitures. After a re-
view of history and past Supreme Court cases, the Court concluded
that civil in rem forfeitures are fines for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment and that the Excessive Fines Clause should be applied
where such fines are found to impose punishment.37 The Court recog-
nized that "[the notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it,
cuts across the division between the civil and criminal law."38 Be-
cause civil as well as criminal actions can serve both remedial and
punitive goals,39 the Court determined that the purpose of the sanc-
tion, rather than the label placed upon the action, determines whether
punishment has been imposed.
The Court set forth the following test for punishment:
We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes
to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.
We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part
to punish.... [A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either re-
tributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under-
stand the term.40
So long as the sanction serves solely remedial aims, there is no pun-
ishment and the Excessive Fines Clause is not implicated. But, once
35. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
36. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
37. "The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments,
whether in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense.' Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993).
38. Id. at 610.
39. Id.
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The test could be described more accurately as
a threshold test for excessiveness rather than a test to determine if the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to any given sanction.
[Ilt appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to all forfeitures... or only to those that cannot be
characterized as purely remedial. The Clause prohibits only the imposi-
tion of "excessive" fines, and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes
cannot be considered "excessive" in any event.
Id. at 622 n.14.
1997]
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the sanction goes on to serve other purposes, such as deterrence or
retribution, the sanction is subject to the limitations of the Excessive
Fines Clause. The Court also concluded that, at least when instru-
mentalities are concerned, "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem
forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment."41 And, statutory in rem forfeitures of vehicles
and real property are presumed not to be totally remedial because,
due to the widely disparate values of property subject to forfeiture, it
is "a penalty that has absolutely no correlation to any damages sus-
tained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."42
B. Forfeiture Based on Owner's Negligence
In Austin, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, attempted
to reconcile the recognition of punishment in statutory in rem forfeit-
ures with past cases allowing forfeiture of property belonging to inno-
cent owners. Justice Blackmun concluded that the justifying notion
underlying in rem statutory forfeitures is the presumption that the
owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused. For
Justice Blackmun, this is true regardless of whether the court uses
the theory that the property is guilty or the theory that the owners are
responsible for the misuse of their property by others under some no-
tion of vicarious liability.4s To a degree, this comports with previous
cases, but only if innocence is viewed as more than a lack of culpability
pertaining to the offense giving rise to the forfeiture. If consistency
with precedence is to be maintained, innocence of implied negligence
must be included as a component of Blackmun's theory. Essentially,
because the innocent owners in the previous cases consented to the
use of their property by the wrongdoers, they were not so innocent as
to overcome a presumption of negligence." Thus, Blackmun makes
the distinction between the "innocent" and the "truly innocent"
owner.45 Succinctly stated, the "innocent owners" in previous cases
41. Id. at 618. The two other classes of forfeitable property--contraband and pro-
ceeds-do not give rise to punishment because the owner can have no legitimate
property right in them.
42. Id. at 621 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 618.
44. Until the dicta in Calero-Toledo, the owner had no opportunity in statutory in
rem forfeitures to overcome the presumption of negligence because the actions of
the owner (beyond voluntary transfer of the property) were not considered.
45. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615-18 (1993). Implicit in Blackmun's
analysis is the notion that if property is misused after the owner voluntarily re-
linquishes control, the owner is presumed to be negligent by a process similar to
res ipsa loquitur. That presumption can be rebutted only by a showing that the
owner hag actively done "all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
unlawful use of his property." Id. at 616. But the availability of such a rebuttal
remains only a possibility because the Court has continued to reserve the ques-
tion of whether a "truly innocent" owner may have his property forfeited.
[Vol. 76:155164
IN REM CIVIL FORFEITURE
have not been innocent enough. (Since Peisch, the Court has not rec-
ognized a "truly innocent" owner.)
This reasoning implicates a constitutional requirement of some de-
gree of culpability on the part of the property owner, even if it is only
the presumption of negligence. But that is not at all clear from the
holdings of previous cases, none of which expressly relied on any one
theory for their holdings, but relied instead on the traditional strict
application of the guilty property fiction. Although the Court did not
expressly address the issue, it did acknowledge that recent cases re-
served the question of whether the property of a truly innocent owner
can be forfeited,46 thus questioning the Court's own conclusion that in
rem forfeitures of "innocent owners rest upon the notion of negli-
gence. If the forfeiture is based on a presumption of negligence on the
part of the owner in allowing the property to be used unlawfully, how
can an owner whose property has been stolen, assuming the theft was
not the result of negligence by the owner, suffer a forfeiture when the
owner allowed no use of the property at all?
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Austin, highlights the narrow-
ness of the Court's reading of previous cases involving innocent own-
ers. Moreover, Scalia dismisses the entire exercise as unnecessary to
establish the existence of punishment in in rem forfeitures. While
agreeing that the forfeiture under the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act in Austin does constitute punishment for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment, he strongly questions the Court's proposition
that any degree of culpability on the part of the owner is a prerequisite
for in rem forfeitures or for finding that punishment exists in those
forfeitures. 47 Scalia believes the guilty property fiction should be
given greater weight than does the majority. If culpability is required,
Scalia argues the distinction between in rem and in personam forfeit-
ures is effectively erased and "[w]ell established common-law distinc-
46. Id. at 617. 'The more recent cases have expressly reserved the question whether
the fiction could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner."
Id.
47. The Court apparently believes, however, that only actual culpability of
the affected property owner can establish that a forfeiture provision is
punitive, and sets out to establish... that such culpability exists in the
case of in rem forfeitures.... [Tihe case law is far more ambiguous than
the Court acknowledges. We have never held that the Constitution re-
quires negligence, or any other degree of culpability, to support such
forfeitures.
Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1997]
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tions should not be swept away by reliance on bits of dicta."48 Three
other Justices agreed with this criticism.49
Justice Scalia also addressed the next logical question, which the
majority left to the lower court on remand: if the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to in rem forfeitures, what is the measure of excessive-
ness in such cases? In Scalia's view, both the culpability of the owner
and the value of the property are irrelevant. "The question is not how
much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated
property has a close enough relationship to the offense.... Was it
close enough to render the property, under traditional standards,
'guilty' and hence forfeitable?50 In response, the majority stated:
"We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the
property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no
way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors .... .51
Austin's addition to forfeiture jurisprudence is four-fold. First, any
fine or forfeiture (including in rem forfeitures) that has retribution or
deterrence among its purposes is punishment. Second, in rem forfeit-
ures of real property and conveyances are presumed to result in pun-
ishment, which is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines
Clause. Third, though arguably in dicta, the majority for the first time
stated that the underlying justification for forfeitures applied to own-
ers uninvolved in the underlying offense is the notion of negligence on
the part of the owner. And fourth, the Court recognized that despite
the nature of an in rem forfeiture action aimed solely at the guilty
property, yet another constitutional protection is available to the
owner-the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.52 These factors
result in an implicit denial that the innocence of the property owner is
irrelevant in an in rem forfeiture proceeding.
VI. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
A. Statement of the Case
The recognition of punishment in statutory in rem civil forfeitures
raises the conflict between the oft-held lack of a constitutional inno-
48. Id. at 626 (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia in questioning whether the owner's culpability is required to uphold a for-
feiture or to find punishment in that forfeiture. Id. at 629 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
50. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 623 n.15.
52. The Court stated that as a general matter the constitutional protections applied
to civil in rem forfeitures distinguish between protections available in civil as
opposed to criminal cases, except where the civil sanction is so punitive as to be
considered criminal in nature or where the statute in question makes the culpa-
bility of the owner relevant. Id. at 608 n.4.
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cent owner's defense and the axiom, basic to American jurisprudence,
that innocent parties should not be punished. By a narrow majority,
the Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to recognize a
constitutional innocent owner's defense in Bennis v. Michigan53 and
backed away from the possibility.
In 1988, John and Tina Bennis were joint owners of a recently
purchased 1977 Pontiac sedan that John Bennis regularly used to
commute to work. John Bennis was arrested while engaged in a sex-
ual act with a prostitute in the front seat of the car. Because the of-
ficers did not witness any payment, he was charged with, and
eventually convicted of, gross indecency. Prior to John Bennis' convic-
tion, the county prosecutor moved to abate the vehicle as a nuisance
under Michigan's statutory abatement scheme.54 Tina Bennis, the
wife, testified that she had no knowledge of her husband's involve-
ment with prostitutes and no knowledge of his illicit use of the vehicle
either on the evening in question or at the time the vehicle was
purchased and titled in both of their names.55 The State did not dis-
pute this assertion. Tina Benis argued that her innocence in the mat-
ter precluded the forfeiture of her interest in the vehicle. The county
court, however, approved the forfeiture of the vehicle and declined to
grant Tina Bennis any share of the proceeds of the sale, even though it
53. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
54. Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of
lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for
the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons... is declared a nui-
sane ... and all... nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided
in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her
servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains
any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set
forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.
MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996). Section 600.3825 states
in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in
an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be
entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct
the removal from the building or place of all furniture, fixtures and con-
tents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the manner provided for
the sale of chattels under execution....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a
nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order
and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the
sale of any furniture, fixture, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as pro-
vided in this section, the officer executing the order of the court shall,
after deducting the expenses of keeping such property and costs of such
sale, pay all liens according to their priorities... and shall pay the bal-
ance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the
state....
MC Com. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987).
55. Bennis v. Mchigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996).
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noted that it had the authority to do so. 56 The court justified this deci-
sion by noting that John and Tina Bennis owned another vehicle and
"itihere's practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as
this."57
Tina Bennis appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals re-
versed. Relying on previous Michigan Supreme Court rulings, the
court of appeals held that an owner's interest could not be abated
without proof that she knew how the car was to be used. The court
also ruled that the car could not qualify as a nuisance simply because
of a single occurrence of a sexual act without evidence of a continuing
or ongoing unlawful use.58 The Michigan Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the abatement.59
The Michigan Supreme Court held the episode in the Bennis car
was a nuisance as a matter of state law. John Bennis was arrested in
a neighborhood with a reputation for prostitution activity. Finding
that a general condition of nuisance existed in the neighborhood, the
court reasoned that any cars entering the area for purposes of prosti-
tution "are being 'used for' the continuance of this nuisance."60 Thus,
even a vehicle used only once for a sexual act contributes to the contin-
uing nuisance condition that can be abated provided the act takes
place in an area known for prostitution.61 Further, the court resolved
a conflict in Michigan case law, holding that the Michigan statute al-
lowed the abatement of Tina Bennis' interest even though she had no
knowledge of the illicit use of the vehicle at the time she entrusted her
interest to her husband.62 The Michigan Supreme Court then re-
viewed a long line of United States Supreme Court cases relying on
the "guilty property" fiction in in rem civil forfeiture. Quoting sub-
stantial sections of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. and
Van Oster v. Kansas,63 the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that
Tina Bennis' innocence was "without constitutional consequence." 64
In responding to a dissent, the court also pointed out that the abate-
ment action sounded in equity, that the trial court had discretion to
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Atty. v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 733
(Mich Ct. App. 1993).
59. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich.
1994).
60. Id. at 491.
61. Id. at 491 n.22.
62. "Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants
or any of them, is not required." MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.3815(2) (West
1987).
63. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
64. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 494 (Mich.
1994).
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shape an appropriate remedy, and that the trial court had not abused
its discretion. 65
Tina Bennis applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, arguing that the forfeiture of her interest in the vehicle vio-
lated due process or, in the alternative, that the forfeiture of her inter-
est was a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.66
Tina Benis' due process argument used a two-prong approach.
First, relying on dicta from Austin and Calero-Toledo, Tina Benis sug-
gested the forfeiture of property belonging to "innocent" owners rests
upon the notion that the owner had been somehow negligent. Thus, a
forfeiture action might not lie against an "innocent" owner who
demonstrated she had done all that was reasonable to prevent the
misuse. Bennis essentially claimed that she had a right to have her
innocence or culpability considered by the court in the forfeiture ac-
tion. Second, relying onAustin, which equated in rem forfeitures with
punishment for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, Bennis argued that the state has no legitimate
interest in punishing an innocent person, and that it is a violation of
due process to punish a person in an action where the state has no
burden of proof regarding the culpability of the person. Bennis then
urged that the Court adopt a test for "innocent" owners based on sec-
tion 308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines negligent
entrstment.67
In her alternative attack, Bennis invoked the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause to challenge the trial court's refusal to pay her the
balance of the proceeds of the sale (after costs), which instead went to
the state's general coffers. Bennis claimed that, despite a clear lack of
culpability for the actions leading to the forfeiture, the state took her
interest in the vehicle to finance law enforcement and other general
activities of the state, burdens that the public as a whole should bear.
In contrast, the State of Michigan chose not to cast the issue as a
traditional forfeiture argument. Rather, the State framed the issue as
the exercise of police power. By analogy, the State argued that the
lack of culpability was simply another example of strict liability that
attaches with the ownership of property.68
65. Id. at 495.
66. See Brief for Petitioner, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)(No. 94-8729).
One can only speculate as to why Bennis did not claim the forfeiture was an ex-
cessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. Perhaps she felt the low dollar value
of the vehicle precluded the argument.
67. "It is negligence to permit a third party to use a thing... which is under the
control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends or
is likely to use the thing... in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm to others." Id. at 25 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or ToRTS § 308
(1965)).
68. See Brief for Respondent, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)(No. 94-8729).
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By a five vote majority, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' interest in the vehicle. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist cast the issue as a traditional forfei-
ture question. After reviewing past cases beginning with The Pal-
myra and continuing through Calero-Toledo, the majority concluded
Bennis' due process arguments were without merit. The Court re-
jected the dicta from previous cases, primarily Calero-Toledo, upon
which Bennis' first due process argument relied. "[I]t is to the hold-
ings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend."69
Having stripped away the main thrust of the first due process argu-
ment, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not afford
protection to Tina Bennis' interest.
Petitioner is in the same position as the various owners involved in the forfei-
ture cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827. She did not know that her
car would be used in an illegal activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But
under these cases the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not protect her.
7 0
The Court did not reach Bennis' second due process argument because
the Court denied that Tina Bennis had been punished by the forfei-
ture action.
Bennis' takings challenge was also summarily rejected.7 ' The
Court reasoned that since the state obtained the vehicle without viola-
tion of due process, the state need not compensate Bennis because the
state already owned the property by virtue of an authority other than
that of eminent domain.72
69. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 999 (1996)(citation omitted).
70. Id.
71. An analysis of the takings challenge is beyond the scope of this Note. For an
investigation of possible takings challenges to civil in rem forfeitures, see J. Kelly
Strader, Taking the Wind Out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures and Just
Compensation, 23 PEpP. L. Rav. 449 (1996).
72. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (1996). The Court relied on two cases
with little or no relation to the issues in Bennis: United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S.
488 (1973), and United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). In Fuller, the Court
held that the government need not compensate a landowner for the increased
market value of his property due to revocable grazing permits, issued by the gov-
ernment, associated with the land that was taken by eminent domain. In Rands,
the Court held that the power to regulate navigation confers upon the federal
government a dominant servitude in navigable waters and all beds and lands
under the high water mark- Thus the property rights of riparian owners have
always been subject to the government's right to regulate and manipulate the
waters and beds of navigable waters. Both of these cases resolve the takings
issue in favor of the government by invoking either value added to land by the
government or the government's superior property rights. Neither of these ele-
ments is present in Bennis. The State of Michigan did not hold any property
rights in the Bennis automobile, and no portion of the value of the automobile
was a result of revocable benefit conferred by the state.
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B. Analysis
Bennis' first due process argument was weak and was defeated by
the traditional application of the guilty property fiction found in the
holdings of past cases. The dicta in Calero-Toledo did raise the possi-
bility that an innocent owner could prevail in an in rem forfeiture ac-
tion if she could show both that she was unaware of the unlawful use
and that she took all reasonable steps to prevent the unlawful use of
the property. However, dicta in other decisions, beginning with
Peisch, is much narrower than the dicta in Calero-Toledo, suggesting
only that an owner may not have her property forfeited if it is stolen or
otherwise used without her consent.73 Even if the Court had chosen
to entertain the Calero-Toledo dicta, Bennis' argument may have
fallen flat because she attempted to broaden that dicta even further by
claiming that her unique status as a wife and co-owner presumes no
additional reasonable steps could be taken, therefore exempting her
from making such a showing. It can be expected, Bennis argued, that
a man who uses prostitutes will take pains to conceal that fact from
his wife; absent any knowledge of her husband's use of prostitutes,
much less his intention to employ a prostitute in the jointly-owned car
in an area known for its vice trade, what reasonable steps could Tina
Bennis be expected to take?74
Bennis also argued that her status as a joint owner distinguished
her situation from that of owners in previous forfeiture cases. At all
times, her husband, as a joint owner, possessed as much right to use
the vehicle as she did. Tina Bennis could do nothing, short of notify-
ing the police, that would not unlawfully infringe upon her husband's
property rights in the car.75 Therefore, she argued that she was effec-
tively prevented from proactively averting the unlawful use of the car
by her husband.
The distinction does not hold up when compared to previous cases,
however. In Goldsmith-Grant, the innocent owner was a chattel mort-
gage holder. As such, the company had no right to interfere with the
possessory rights of the buyer who used the vehicle unlawfully. Simi-
larly, in Dobbins's Distillery, the lessor was legally powerless to affect
the behavior of the lessee as long as the lessee did not act counter to
the contractual obligations in the lease. Malek Adhel differed only in
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74. Brief for Petitioner at 27-29, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)(No. 94-
8729).
75. In oral argument in support of an amicus curiae brief, the United States indi-
cated that a wife who suspects her husband is using a jointly owned car to meet
with a prostitute should call the police to preserve her innocence for the purpose
of any constutional arguments. (Laughter interrupted the complete explanation.)
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 61, Bennis v. Michigan, 116
S. Ct. 994 (1996)(No. 94-8729).
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that it was a physical impossibility rather than a legal impossibility
that theoretically prevented the owners of the ship from taking any
preventative steps because the unlawful acts took place after the ship
was on the high seas. In all three cases, the "innocent" owner was
either legally or practicably precluded from preventing the unlawful
use of the property. Thus Bennis' situation is in fact no different than
that of previous innocent owners in previous cases.
The above arguments illustrate the difficulty of determining a
practical application of the Calero-Toledo dicta. The "reasonable
steps" envisioned by the Calero-Toledo Court would evidently require
a very strong showing, which would necessarily vary with the type of
property involved and the nature of the owner-user relationship in
each case.76 Further, it must be remembered that these are steps to
be taken by an owner who is wholly unaware of the unlawful use. In
Calero-Toledo, the lessor had included in the lease a clause prohibit-
ing the use of the yacht for an unlawful purpose.7 7 It is difficult to
imagine any further measures the lessor could have taken to prevent
an unlawful use and yet remain in the realm of the reasonable or eco-
nomically feasible. It is doubtful that a lessee would enter into an
agreement that allowed for or required random searches by the owner.
Nonetheless, the vessel was forfeited. Because the Calero-Toledo
dicta is a singular expansion of the innocent owners exception, and
because it is inherently unworkable in real life applications, it is
doubtful the Court will adopt the dicta as the basis for a test in the
future.
Although Bennis' reliance on the Calero-Toledo dicta is unwork-
able, the Court's resolution is equally unsatisfying. Holding that the
action in Bennis satisfied the requirements of due process simply be-
cause similar actions had done so in the past 78 leaves unanswered the
question of exactly how due process was satisfied.7 9 Some underlying
theory must justify or explain the imposition of forfeiture on an inno-
76. For example, a transfer of property in a commercial setting, such as a lease for
land, may include clauses in the lease to prevent certain uses or to allow for regu-
lar inspections. Loaning a car to a friend for a short time, on the other hand, may
involve nothing more than a seat-of-the-pants evaluation of the borrower's trust-
worthiness and driving ability. Similarly, while the owner may be aware that a
car might be used to transport narcotics, the same could not reasonably be ex-
pected of a farm tractor.
77. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 693 (1974)(Douglas,
J., dissenting).
78. "[Tlhe cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." Bennis
v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (1996).
79. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in reconciling the holding with traditional
notions of due process. Id. Justice Thomas addressed the conflict more fully, but
agreed with the majority that traditional application of the guilty property fiction
should prevail.
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cent owner. The Austin Court concluded that the justification was a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner for allowing the
unlawful use of the property. But without some test for culpability or
an opportunity to make a contrary showing, such as that suggested by
the Calero-Toledo dicta, the presumption becomes irrebuttable. An ir-
rebuttable presumption of negligence or guilt on the part of the owner
is, in effect, a judicial fiat holding that the owner deserves to be "pun-
ished" whether or not any negligent culpability actually exists.
This is inconsistent with the Court's continued reservation of the
question of whether property stolen from an owner and later used un-
lawfully may be forfeited. If no culpability is required, why should
owners whose property has been stolen be treated differently? The
only difference between the two cases is the element of consent. Ar-
guably, consent alone cannot be deemed conclusary evidence of negli-
gence strong enough to support an irrebuttable presumption as it
certainly is not a unique element of negligence. Unless the Court ex-
pands the fiction of "tainted" property to hold that the stain spreads to
the owner through the act of consent, the act of consent alone will not
comport with traditional standards of proof required to inflict punish-
ment on an individual in criminal or civil actions, assuming that such
a forfeiture is indeed "punishment."
C. Punishment: Now You See It, Now You Don't
The second prong of Bennis' due process argument was stronger
than the first. Had Bennis relied solely on the Calero-Toledo dicta and
the inherent injustice of the sanction, the case would have been un-
remarkable in that it simply maintained the status quo of forfeiture
jurisprudence. But since Calero-Toledo, the Court in Halper and Aus-
tin determined that the concept of punishment transcends the civil-
criminal distinction.80 Under these two cases, if a sanction serves
As the Court notes, evasion of the normal requirement of proof before
punishment might well seem "unfair." One unaware of the history of
forfeiture laws and 200 years of this Coures precedent regarding such
laws might well assume that such a scheme is lawless-a violation of
due process .... "If the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent
paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize the [statute
at issue] with the accepted tests of human conduct.... There is strength
... in the contention that ... [the statute at issue] seems to violate thatjustice which should be the foundation of the due process of law required
by the Constitution."
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)(citations omittedXquoting Goldsmith-Grant v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921)(alteration in original)).
80. "The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the divi-
sion between the civil and criminal law...." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 448 (1989Xexplaining that the nature of the sanctions imposed in a civil
proceeding must be assessed to determine if they fall within the double jeopardy
protections of the Fifth Amendment).
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either deterrent or retributive purposes, it is punishment. And, for
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
punishment historically is presumed to exist in in rem statutory for-
feitures.81 Thus, two issues must be addressed. First, how does an in
rem action, which punishes owners without any burden of proof by the
State as to owners' culpability or any opportunity to establish their
innocence, comport with due process? Second, if the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to a particular in rem forfeiture, what test is to be used
to determine excessiveness?
The Court in Bennis evaded both issues by finding that Tina Ben-
nis had not been punished, thus implicitly denying the reasoning in its
previous decisions regarding the punitive nature of in rem forfeitures.
The Court used two lines of reasoning. First, the Court pointed to the
trial judge's equitable discretion to craft an appropriate remedy.82
Second, the Court redefined the punishment threshold so clearly set
forth in Halper and Austin.
1. Equitable Label of the Action
The equitable label placed on the forfeiture action is not dispositive
as to the question of punishment. The Michigan statute specifically
calls for the forfeiture of the vehicle without regard to the owner's
knowledge of the nuisance activity or the value of the vehicle. As writ-
ten, the statute does not call for equity, nor does it purport to be a
remedial action. Thus, Austin's presumption of punishment applies to
sanctions imposed under the statute as written.8 3 Michigan case law,
however, gives the trial judge equitable discretion to modify the sanc-
tion.8 4 Arguably, this is enough to overcome the presumption of pun-
ishment. Yet it hardly follows that simply applying the equitable
label to a concededly nonremedial action automatically renders the
sanction solely remedial. The presumption of punishment in statutory
in rem forfeitures of vehicles and real property is merely a starting
point for the investigation of whether or not punishment actually oc-
currs.8 5 Both Austin and Halper held that the purpose of the sanc-
81. In determining whether or not the particular forfeiture in Austin was punish-
ment, the Court began with the presumption of punishment, then examined the
statute itself and legislative history to determine if factors indicated that it was
not punishment. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1993).
82. Bennis v. IMichigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996).
83. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); supra text accompanying note
81.
84. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)(No. 94-
8729).
85. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); supra text accompanying note
81.
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tion, rather than the label of the action, is the measure of whether or
not punishment exists.86
In Bennis, the trial judge not only declined to split the sale price
with Tina Bennis, which would have preserved all of her interest, but
also declined to give her any portion of the proceeds of the sale after
costs.8 7 The trial judge justified his decision by stating that "there's
practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this."88
Even assuming, arguendo, that Tina Bennis' interest could be reached
at all without offending due process, if the action was truly remedial
and nonpunitive, half of what little money was left after costs were
deducted should have been turned over to Tina Bennis. Once the
amount of forfeiture exceeded the state's costs, the sanction ceased to
be solely remedial. Added to this is retribution and deterrence,
thereby punishment8 9 despite the equitable label. The statute au-
thorized the judge to forfeit all interest in the vehicle, but equity did
not. Under Austin, unless a sanction fairly can be described as solely
remedial, it is at least in part punishment, and the protections of the
Excessive Fines Clause apply.90 The existence of punishment not only
implicates the Excessive Fines Clause, but also places the second
prong of Bennis' due process argument squarely before the Court.
2. Deterrence By Any Other Name...
Possibly realizing that the equitable label alone failed to negate
the possibility of punishment, the Court cast a cloud over the test for
punishment set forth in Halper and Austin. In Austin, the Court
stated that "[tihe Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment
for some offense." 91 Thus, the remaining question to determine if the
Eighth Amendment applies is not "whether [an action] is civil or crim-
86. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
87. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996).
88. Id.
89. Dicta in Halper indicates that the dividing line between remedial and punitive
sanctions may not be subject to such precise delineations. "[T]he Government is
entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according
to somewhat imprecise formulas...." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,446
(1989). However, this should not be controlling for two reasons. First, Halper
dealt with a monetary fine as opposed to an in rem forfeiture. Second, Halper
dealt with punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which re-
quires a much stronger showing than that for the protections of the Excessive
Fines Clause. Punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is found
in a civil sanction when the sanction "bears no rational relation to the goal of
compensating the Government for it's loss." Id. at 449.
90. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
91. Id. at 609-10 (citations and quotations omitted).
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inal, but rather whether it is punishment."92 Austin and Halper held
that a forfeiture need not have a wholly punitive purpose for the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause to apply.
We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part
to punish .... "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either re-
tributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand
the term."9
3
In response to Bennis' assertion that the forfeiture of her interest
in the vehicle was punishment, the Court pointed to justifications
used in pre-Austin forfeiture cases involving innocent owners. The
Court concluded that "forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose dis-
tinct from any punitive purpose."94 This statement directly opposes
the categorical holdings of both Austin and Halper. The deterrence in
Bennis operates "'both by preventing further illicit use of the [prop-
erty] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal
behavior unprofitable."95
The Court's reliance on this quote from Calero-Toledo is inconclu-
sive at best. While the Calero-Toledo Court did state that "forfeiture
statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes," 9 6 no effort was
made to distinguish the two purposes or to explain how the deterrent
characteristics were divorced from the punishment.97 The Austin
Court used the same citation from Calero-Toledo to determine that
"forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular his-
torically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment."98
Yet, the Bennis Court made no effort to distinguish the deterrence in
Bennis from that in Austin or Halper. The deterrent purposes cited
suggest both specific and general forms of deterrence, both of which
are traditional goals of punishment.99 No indication was asserted in
Austin or Halper that some deterrence was punitive while some was
92. Id. at 610.
93. Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)(emphasis added)).
94. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996)(emphasis added).
95. Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 683, 687
(1974)(alteration in original)). The Court went on to compare this deterrence to
the deterrent action of negligence laws, which would make Tina Bennis liable for
damages caused by her husband's negligent operation of the vehicle. But as Jus-
tice Stevens points out in his dissent, tort liability is based on compensation. Id
at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Tort liability does not result in punishment im-
posed by the state.
96. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974).
97. Because the Calero-Toledo Court was exploring the governmental interests em-
bodied in the forfeiture statute and not determining whether or not punishment
existed for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, a careful reading could
conclude that the Court used the terms "punitive" and "retributive"
synonymously.
98. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
99. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
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not. As Justice Stevens points out in his lengthy dissent, "deterrence
is itself one of the aims of punishment."100 Logically, retribution and
deterrence have separate and distinct purposes. Deterrence, however,
cannot occur unless it is the result of punishment or the threat of pun-
ishment. As stated previously in Halper, '[r]etribution and deter-
rence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.'" 101
VII. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Court in Bennis backed away from the categorical definition of
punishment laid down in Austin, but offered nothing to take its place.
To defeat Bennis' second due process argument that the state has no
legitimate interest in punishing an innocent person, the Court went
out of its way to find that Tina Bennis was not punished.1o 2 Several
other avenues, however, were open to the Court. The Court could
have found that Tina Bennis had been punished, but that since own-
ers have been similarly punished for time out of mind, due process
was not violated.1os
Alternatively, the Court could have agreed that Benis committed
no offense, thus avoiding the label of punishment and the due process
implications. This argument would comport withAustin because Aus-
tin defines punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause as payment
to the government for some offense. On the other hand, this same ar-
gument would be inconsistent with the Michigan statute, which spe-
cifically declares that any owner of a vehicle used in violation of the
statue is "guilty of a nuisance."10 4 Because Austin's reliance on negli-
gence as the underlying theory is inconsistant with the Michigan stat-
ute's reliance on strict liability, the Court cannot use both theroies.
As another alternative, the Court also could have held that Bennis
100. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1009 (1996XStevens, J., dissenting).
101. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989Xquoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 529 n.20 (1979)).
102. Justice Thomas perhaps illustrates the Court's motivations.
And if the forfeiture of the car here (and the State's refusal to remit any
share of the proceeds of its sale to Mrs. Bennis) can appropriately be
characterized as "remedial" action, then the more severe problems in-
volved in punishing someone not found to have engaged in wrongdoing of
any kind do not arise.
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (1996XThomas, J., concurring).
103. The Court used this argument to defeat the first prong of Bennis' due process
argument, saying that in rem forfeitures are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." Id. at 1001 (quoting
Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)). But reliance on
previous cases would not be totally persuasive since no previous petitioner had
raised the specific claim of punishment imposed by the state in an action where
the state has no burden of proof as to culpability.
104. MICH Com'. LAwS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1995).
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
was punished, but that it was a de minimus level of punishment with
which the Constitution is not concerned.105
Another logical solution would have been to agree that Tina Bennis
was punished and afford her protection under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. This would have eliminated the
messy effort to find that there was no punishment and, at the same
time, would render moot the due process problem. Because lower
courts since Austin have developed differing tests for excessiveness in
in rem forfeitures,106 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to define
the proper test, rather than remand as the Court did in Austin. In the
vast majority of possible applications of the Excessive Fines Clause,
the question presented is the following: How much can this person be
punished without offending justice? The inquiry necessarily involves
a weighing of the fine imposed against the nature and severity of the
offense committed, the culpability of the owner being previously deter-
mined at trial.107
Because in rem forfeiture is nominally against the property that
has committed an offense, Justice Scalia condenses this inquiry into
the single question of whether or not the property was used in a man-
ner or activity that traditionally would support a forfeiture.108 But
105. This would have been possible only if the Court found Tina Bennis was punished
by the forfeiture of her half of the proceeds after costs were deducted. Since the
record did not indicate what that amount was, other than mentioning the trial
judge's estimate of "practically nothing," the Court had nothing upon which to
base a formulation. However, the concept of a de minimus amount of punishment
has been articulated before. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977)(analyzing corporal punishment in a public school setting).
106. For a survey of some lower court applications of the Excessive Fines Clause to in
rem forfeitures after Austin, see Meredith S. Katz, Attorney General of the State
of New York v. One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler: Does the Punishment Fit the
Crime?, 12 TouRo L. REv. 715 (1996); Hager & Welling, supra note 6.
107. Very little Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence exists. In evaluating monetary
fines, Courts have applied a proportionality review based on Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983). The factors in this investigation include: gravity of the offense,
harshness of the penalty, comparison of the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction, and comparison of the sentences imposed for similar
crimes in other jurisdictions. Id.
108. Even using this narrow test, the forfeiture in Bennis would not be allowed.
But an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the
Eighth Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot be prop-
erly regarded as an instrumentality of the offense-the building, for ex-
ample, in which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a
confiscation would be an excessive fine.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1993)(Sealia, J., concurring). Sim-
ilarly, the vehicle in Bennis was used for one isolated tryst, and the State offered
no evidence it had been used in such a manner before. Traditionally, one isolated
occurrence of a sexual act in a car does not support the determination that it is an
abatable nuisance. It could also be argued that the strict application of the guilty
property fiction was traditionally limited to cases in admiralty, breaches of the
revenue laws, and similar serious felonies. Expanding the heavy-handed strict
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this question is no different from the primary question of guilt of the
property, which is properly addressed at trial. The major problem
with this limited approach is that it leads to the conclusion that old
Pontiacs are afforded Eighth Amendment protection, but the owners
are not. The Excessive Fines Clause is a constitutional protection per-
sonal to the owner and a check on the government's power.10 9 Despite
the guilty property fiction, the Court has recognized that it is the
owner who is punished. It hardly makes sense to judge the excessive-
ness of a fine without considering the culpability or actions of the
owner suffering punishment.11o The guilty property fiction controls
the procedure of the in rem action, precluding any consideration of the
owner's guilt or innocence. But the Excessive Fines analysis is a sepa-
rate review for the benefit of the owner, not a part of the in rem action,
and therefore should not participate in the fiction at all.
Several factors are applied to evaluate the excessiveness of an in
rem forfeiture. These factors include: the severity of the underlying
offense, the extent of the property's involvement in the offense, and
the property's fair value. Most of these are beyond the scope of this
Note. However, because in rem forfeiture punishes the owner, and the
owner may or may not be the person immediately responsible for the
misuse resulting in the forfeiture, an investigation into the relation-
ship between the owner, the property, and the misuse is necessary to
avoid a punishment that would bear no rational relation to the con-
duct of the owner.1 11 If the conduct of the owner is one factor to con-
application of the guilty property fiction to minor misdemeanors weakens the ar-
gument that the state's interest is so strong as to override the traditional aspects
of due process afforded an individual being punished by the state.
109. "The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments
... ." Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993). In Austin, the Court
suggested the Government relied too heavily on the technical distinctions be-
tween in rem and in personam forfeitures. The Court implied the constitutional
protections implicated by the punitive nature of the sanction would trump any
conflicting procedural technicalities that arose from the strict application of the
guilty property fiction. Id at 616 n.9.
110. "The question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the
confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the offense." Id. at 628
(Scalia, J., concurringXemphasis added). The question is appropriate, but when
evoking the Eighth Amendment protections of the owner, it should be asked if the
owner has a close enough relationship to the offense.
111. At the same time the Court was deciding Austin, the Court also considered the
excessiveness of an in personam forfeiture of a business arising from a RICO con-
viction. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993). In remanding the case,
the Court instructed the court of appeals to evaluate the excessiveness of the
forfeiture in light of the defendant's criminal conduct. Id. at 559. Since a forfei-
ture, whether in rem or in personam, results in the same punitive effect on the
owner, and the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause is to protect the individual
from excessive punishment, the criteria used to determine excessiveness should
be the same. Indeed, the only distinction that the Court drew between the forfei-
ture in Alexander and that in Austin is that an in personam forfeiture arising
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sider in applying the Excessive Fines Clause to an in rem forfeiture,
there must be a minimum threshold of culpability.
The common element of all previous innocent owner forfeiture
cases is the voluntary transfer of the property from the owner to an-
other who then uses the property unlawfully. In addition, because of
the nature of the relationships between the owners and the wrongdo-
ers, the previous cases also included a discrete transaction or moment
of decision when the owner is chargeable with evaluating the ability
and trustworthiness of the user before voluntarily relinquishing con-
trol. Indeed, in most instances addressed by the Court, the use of the
property was the focus, or raison d'etre, of the relationship between
the owner and the wrongdoer. Ship owners hire masters specifically
for the purpose of taking control of the vessel. Thus, ship owners
rightly should take pains to hire a master with the proper reputation
and credentials. Sales and leases are entered into for the very pur-
pose of transferring possession and control of property. Even in a situ-
ation where a friend asks to borrow a vehicle, it is an identifiable
transaction within the existing relationship between the owner and
the friend where the owner has an opportunity, and a duty, to exercise
his judgement as to the fitness of the friend to use the vehicle
properly.
This analysis fits well with the notion of the owner's negligence as
the underlying theory supporting in rem statutory forfeiture applied
to owners innocent of the underlying offense. To impute negligence to
an owner, the owner must have had an opportunity to be negligent.
As long as a point of decision can be identified, the owner can be
charged with making the wrong decision. Similarly, this analysis
comports with the alternative justification of deterrence as a legiti-
mate government interest, which argues forfeiture of property belong-
ing to innocent owners causes owners to exercise greater care in
transferring their property.112 If, however, there is no identifiable
from a criminal conviction does not require the investigation laid down in Austin
to determine if the forfeiture operates as punishment. Id. For discussion in sup-
port of considering an owner's culpability as a factor in determining excessive-
ness see Welling & Hager, supra note 6, at 872-73; Christopher Zemp Campbell,
Note, Excessive Means: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil In Rem Forfeit-
ures Under United States v. Chandler, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2284, 2298-3000 (1995).
The 1994 amendments to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970, in light
of Austin and Alexander, "limit [for Excessive Fines purposes] the scope of a for-
feiture judgement to the extent the court finds the effect of the forfeiture is
grossly disproportionate to the nature and severity of the owner's conduct." Ray-
mond P. Pepe, Alternative Proposals for the Reform of State Legislation Dealing
With Forfeitures For Drug Offenses, 21 Wm. MrrcHELL L. REv. 197, 210 (1995).
One factor essential to this inquiry is the "nature and extent of the owner's culpa-
bility." Id.
112. "To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or
secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the
[Vol. 76:155
IN REM CIVIL FORFEITURE
point of decision, there can be no opportunity for that deterrence to
have its desired effect.113
The identifiable point of decision should be used as a threshold test
for the measure of the owner's culpability in the application of the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause. If no transaction or moment identifies when the
owner is chargeable with exercising discretion or judgement regarding
the transferring of control of her property, then any forfeiture would
work an excessive fine because the owner is not culpable. In the case
of Tina Bennis, the Court made no finding concerning the control of
her interest in the vehicle. The decision to jointly title the vehicle ef-
fectively granted to Tina Benis a measure of control over her interest
to her husband. Arguably, that was not the purpose of the decision.
The decision of how to hold marital property often includes many fac-
tors besides control, such as insurance, taxes, and general asset man-
agement with respect to family finances. This type of decision varies
dramatically from those involved in the transfer of property in the
Courts earlier innocent owner forfeiture cases, upon which the Court
relies.
Once the threshold requirement of an identifiable point of decision
is met, which essentially establishes that negligence or culpability on
the part of the owner is possible, then the existence or degree of that
culpability can be evaluated. In the vast majority of in rem forfeit-
ures, this question need not be addressed because either the owner
misuses the property or the statute provides for an innocent owner
defense. This threshold for the Excessive Fines analysis is especially
crucial because there is no other opportunity in a proceeding in rem to
raise the issue of the relationship between the offense and the person
being punished.
Austin dictates that once a civil sanction is found to be at least in
part punitive, that sanction is subject to the limitations of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. Had the United States Supreme Court in Bennis
found the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' interest to work an excessive fine,
further questions would arise on remand. If Tina Bennis had incurred
a monetary fine, the trial court simply would eliminate the excessive
portion of the fine. Bennis did not involve a monetary fine, however.
By the time the Court decided Bennis, the State of Michigan had long
since sold the car. Yet, because of the unique facts of the case involv-
ing joint ownership and one culpable owner, the simple remedy of dis-
desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring posses-
sion of their property." Caler-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 688 (1974).
113. As applied to Tina Bennis, Justice Stevens believed deterrence would be inappro-
priate. 'There is no reason to think that the threat of forfeiture will deter an
individual from buying a car with her husband-or from marrying him in the
first place-if she neither knows or has reason to know he plans to use it wrong-
fully." Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1009 (1996)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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allowing the forfeiture of the car was unavailable. Neither party
questioned the state's power to seize and sell the car. Should the
lower court order the state to pay Tina Bennis one half of the sale
price the car fetched at auction? Or should the court order the state to
pay her one-half of the sale price less costs? Only Tina Bennis' half of
the value was in question. Since reimbursing the state for costs is
remedial in nature, the state could return to Tina Bennis half of the
proceeds less costs. This would eliminate the punitive aspect of the
sanction and thus any applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The record is void of any indication of the amount that remained after
costs other than the trial judge's estimate of "practically nothing."
Nevertheless, any fine imposed on an innocent person, no matter how
small, is arguably excessive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The guilty property fiction is indeed too firmly ingrained in Ameri-
can jurisprudence to be abandoned. It is a necessary and convenient
device used to gain jurisdiction and reach the instrumentalities and
proceeds of illegal activities. But it must be remembered that the
guilty property fiction is just that-a fiction-and not a fantasy that
includes the willing suspension of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. While the guilty property fiction is a useful procedural tool, it
cannot be expected that a mere fiction can be used to negate an inno-
cent owner's constitutional protections. Conflicts between the guilty
property fiction and constitutional protections arise when that fiction
is applied to punish innocent owners through the forfeiture of their
property. The Court understandably is reluctant to make any major
changes to the application of the guilty property fiction. Any change
may not be limited solely to cases involving innocent owners and could
impact statutory in rem forfeitures currently used in the government's
war on drugs. But articulating a minimum culpability requirement on
the part of the owner would have no such effect on those statutes be-
cause they already include innocent owner provisions far more inclu-
sive than the minimal culpability threshold described above.1' 4 The
Court's recognition of constitutional protections available to owners
need not hamper the procedural application of the guilty property fic-
tion. Just as the Excessive Fines inquiry takes place after the in rem
action, the unlawful search and seizure inquiry in One 1958 Plymouth
simply determined admissibility of evidence and arguably left un-
changed the procedural aspect of the in rem action.
The impact of Bennis is two-fold. On its face, with the current
political climate favoring harsher penalties and smaller budgets, it
may encourage states to enact more forfeiture laws without innocent
114. See supra note 7.
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owner provisions. Such statutes provide both a source of revenue for
law enforcement agencies and the appearance of prosecutorial
efficiency.
Perhaps the more important impact will arise from the doubt Ben-
nis casts on the holding in Austin, which was not constrained to the
narrow issue of an innocent owner. Austin dealt with an in rem forfei-
ture under § 881 of the federal Drug Control and Enforcement Act,
which engenders a high volume of forfeiture actions. Because the
Court in Bennis treated deterrence differently than in Austin, but
then failed to explain its reasoning or even distinguish the two cases,
a lower court might conclude that deterrence alone now does not con-
stitute punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. As a re-
suit, lower courts may avoid any excessiveness inquiry unless the
sanction clearly has a retributive purpose. So not only will the lower
courts be uncertain of the proper test for excessiveness, they now may
be uncertain when to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to an in rem
forfeiture action. Thus, the result of Bennis may be far-reaching
indeed.
Eric N. Bergquist '98
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